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Abstract
Subsidizing small high-technology rms is now considered to be important
in stimulating economies throughout the world. This is because fast growing
small rms create new markets and jobs. The Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) program has played an important role in the United States
in subsidization providing two billion dollars every year. Japan started its
own SBIR program inspired by that in the United States.
This paper examines the direct eects of Japan's SBIR program through
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the attributes of rms. First, we compared the changes in sales, employment,
and the number of patents between SBIR awardees and matching rms. How-
ever, SBIR awardees did not demonstrate better performance in sales or em-
ployment. Therefore, it seems that the direct eect of Japan's SBIR program
has not produced positive results. However, it did increase the number of
patents. Second, we examined the overall results by using regression mod-
els. Even with control variables, these results were unchanged. Therefore, we
concluded that the results were robust.
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1 Introduction
Japan has suered from a serious long-term recession that began in 1991 and the
Japanese government has tried, by various means, to solve the problem. One way
has been to subsidize small, high-technology rms, which are now considered to play
important roles in stimulating economies throughout the world [1]. This is because
fast growing small rms have created new markets and jobs [2].
There are two rationales to justify such subsidization. First, the social benets
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are greater than the expenditure that rms spent on R&D [3]. Second, private
investors can tap into information that subsidized companies are authorized in the
sense of promising technology. This can be rephrased as an information gap between
rms and investors [4].
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program that was started in
1982 in the United States has played an important role in subsidization providing two
billion dollars every year. The program requires (currently eleven) federal agencies
to set aside (also currently) 2.5 percent of their extramural R&D funds for SBIR.
The program consists of three phases and only winners can proceed to the next
phase. The program is the largest innovation program in the U.S. [7] and there is no
doubt about its importance. Japan started its own SBIR program in 1999 inspired
by that in the United States.
The cost-eectiveness of all policies should be monitored but this is dicult to
do for many of them because the eect spreads into society, making the problem
more complex. Even so, Lerner studied rms which won awards of the U.S. SBIR
program and demonstrated that the rms grew signicantly faster in comparison
with other matched rms and attracted venture nancing [5]. Although Japan's
SBIR program was studied by Eshima [6], his study was limited compared to the
coverage of analyses done by Lerner and his analyses had bias that led readers to
a dierent conclusion from one in this paper. The details on the problems will be
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explained later.
We analyzed Japan's SBIR program by introducing data obtained from rms.
The analyses followed those of Lerner and also included other data and perspectives
to enable characteristics specic to Japan to be investigated. More concretely, we
assessed the growth of rms which won awards of the SBIR program from 2006 to
2010. The analyses were done by comparing of matching rms that were chosen
because they closely resembled the awardees. Growth was measured by sales, em-
ployees, and the number of patents. The analyses had two clear limitations. The
rst one was that they did not include social welfare, which was the eventual goal of
the policies. This means we only found the primary eect of the subsidies. The sec-
ond limitation was that the analyses could not provide alternative policies because
we only studied one policy.
This paper is organized as follows. A brief explanation of the SBIR program is
given in Section 2. Section 3 explains how we constructed the data we used in the
analyses. Section 4 discusses empirical analyses and Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2 SBIR programs
2.1 U.S. SBIR program
The United States' Congress enacted the SBIR Development Act in 1982 and es-
tablished the SBIR program, which mandated that all federal agencies spend more
than $100 million to set aside 0.2 percent of their funds for SBIR. Over the next six
years, the funds that were set aside grew to 1.25 percent. This act was reauthorized
in 1992, as the Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act. At
this time, the funds that were set aside were doubled to 2.5 percent [7]. Congress
passed numerous extensions, the most recent of which extended the act through
2017. Also, the current funds that were set aside were set to 2.8 percent.
Eleven federal agencies have been participating in the program and they have
individual responsibility for the program. Therefore, they have been subsidizing and
conforming to the guidelines set by the SBIR program.
A document published by the Small Business Administration [8] provides current
practical information. Here, we present a plain explanation of the process for the
program.
The SBIR program has three phases.
 Phase I: This phase is aimed at checking the technical advantages, feasibility,
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commercial potential, and the quality of awardee performance prior to support
in Phase II. Phase I awards normally do not exceed $150,000 total costs for
six months.
 Phase II: The main objective of this phase is to continue and enhance the R&D
eorts initiated in Phase I. Only Phase I awardees are eligible for a Phase II
award. Phase II awards normally do not exceed $1,000,000 total costs during
two years.
 Phase III: This phase, where appropriate, is for small businesses to pursue
commercialization objectives resulting from Phase II activities. The SBIR
program does not fund Phase III. Some federal agencies promote the intro-
duction of private investments or provide awardees with production contracts
for products such as the procurements of agencies.
Eligibility for the SBIR program is mainly assessed as follows.
1. Owned independently and at least 51% by U.S. citizens.
2. No more than 500 employees, including aliates.
3. Organized for prot and located in the United States
The achievements of the SBIR program are worth admiring. The SBIR program
assessment done in 2008 [7] found that it was mainly eective in three areas.
6
1. Stimulating technological innovation
2. Increasing private sector commercialization of innovations
3. Providing widely distributed support for innovation activities
2.2 Japan's SBIR program
Japan has been in a serious long-term recession since 1991. The Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry enacted a law in 1999 to facilitate the creation of new
businesses that included Japan's SBIR program to break out of the recession and
secure more employment opportunities, Apparently, Japan had considered the SBIR
program in the U.S. to be successful. Then, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry enacted an act in 2005 to facilitate new business activities by small and
medium-sized enterprises that retained the SBIR program in Japan.
Although the program in Japan was naturally quite similar to that in the U.S.,
there were three considerable dierences.
1. Awards by most ministries and agencies do not have phase systems. Only
around 5% of awards have phase systems that began in 2007 and 2008.
2. Ministries and agencies mainly supported awardees from nances in their own
budget. However, the U.S. program helps awardees to access private invest-
ments and procurements by governments.
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3. The budget is much smaller. It is approximately one fth that of the U.S.
Note that Japan has other initiatives for nurturing small high-technology busi-
nesses. For example, the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Or-
ganization has a number of their own initiatives other than the SBIR program. This
paper only discusses the SBIR program and its eects but naturally does not cover
all initiatives for small high-technology businesses.
3 Data
Since we followed Lerner's analyses, we constructed data almost identical to his and
added additional data for further discussion. As primary data, we acquired published
data from SBIR awardees obtained from the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency.
The data included 3,559 SBIR awardees from 1998 to 2010. However, since many
rms won more than one award, there were 1,640 rms. Table 1 summarized the
number of constructed data. We focused on 507 awardees from 2004 to 2006 to
analyze their growth. Even individuals can win awards in Japan unlike the SBIR
program in the U.S. We omitted individuals since they were not appropriate to the
analyses in this paper. Finally, 301 rms were chosen as awardees from 2004 to
2006. Basically, Japan's SBIR program does not have phase systems, and as phase
II started from 2007 with only 5%, we ignored it as was mentioned earlier.
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We then constructed matching sets to compare means and percentiles and con-
ducted regression analyses. We selected rms that closely resembled awardees from
Teikoku Data Bank (TDB) data, which has one of the most comprehensive data on
rms in Japan.
One set was matched on industry and rm size. The TDB data included its own
industry code. The middle classication has 91 dierent codes and we used this to
categorize rms. Three hundred one rms in the same classication with the closest
sales in 2006 were selected from the TDB data to pair them with 301 awardees.
Another set was matched on geographic location and rm size. The procedure
was similar to that for the industry matching set. We used the two digits at the
head of the zip code. In the same way, three hundred one rms with the same zip
code with the closest sales in 2006 were selected.
The method that was used to construct the data described strictly conform to
Lerner's approach. To reveal current problems with the SBIR program in Japan and
discuss solutions to these, we added supplemental data to each rm. By employing
Institute of Intellectual Property data [9], we could add the number of registered
patents that had been applied in each year by rms.
The data construction in Lerner's work included the investigations into acquiring
investments by venture capitals. However, we could not do the same thing. This
is not because we could not nd data, but private investments in Japan such as
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venture capitals are extremely rare in the rst place. This will be discussed in the
later sections.
The sample data are summarized in Table 2. The matching rms resembled
the awardees closely in sales. The employments of matching rms were higher than
those of the awardees. This is because the denition of a small rm is a rm with
less than 300 employees in manufacturing or less in other industries. This limitation
lowers the number of employees. Age means the dierence between the foundation
year and 2006. We can see capital and age have similar values. However, the number
of applied patents by awardees are seemingly larger than that by matching rms.
This will be discussed in detail later.
4 Empirical analyses
4.1 Overall eect of subsidies
As previously mentioned, this paper focuses on the direct eects of subsidies, and
not their social benets. Even if we had focused on the direct eects, we still have
diculty in estimating them.
First, since people in charge of ministries and agencies may want to show how
successful the SBIR program is, they may tend to choose their own favorite rms.
This situation may inhibit fair competition. Second, similar to the rst perspective,
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technological tasks presented by ministries and agencies may only be overcome by
some specic rms that are more familiar with the problems than others. Finally, it
is critical that subsidies themselves do not help skyrocket R&D in small high-tech
rms. This is because the small rms are organized by one key scientist or engineer
and other members to help him/her. This means that subsidies cannot help to scale
the project up even if they hire more members to help the key person. The most
probable scenario here is that awardees just substitute awards for their own budget
for R&D and prolong the time for R&D. Bearing in mind the purpose of the SBIR
program, this is a crucial concern.
Table 3 lists the overall comparison of growth for awardees and matching rms.
We do not see any dierences in the change in sales from 2006 to 2011 in panel A.
In addition, the t-test to compare means and the Mann-Whitney test to compare
medians indicate no signicance. Although the t-test in panel B does not indi-
cate signicance, the Mann-Whitney test indicated signicance and it seems that
employment of awardees is slightly better.
If we think of the direct eect of awards, especially their direct commercial ef-
fect, the results in panel A mean the SBIR program is disappointing. Although
employment is somewhat better for awardees, employment is limited to under 300
for awardees and therefore the natural decrease is modest. Moreover, better em-
ployment with equivalent sales make us doubt overall growth because it is not sus-
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tainable.
Panel C has the numbers of patents from 2006 to 2011. The panel obviously
indicates that awardees acquired more patents. Intellectual property cannot be
considered to be direct growth but the awardees demonstrated more possibilities of
growth in terms of seeds of commercialization and the results also indicate that the
process of choosing awardees is probably sound.
The overall results in panels A and B are dierent from the SBIR program studied
by Lerner. The overall results for the SBIR program in the U.S. were signicantly
positive.
Comparing situations in two dierent countries is never easy at any time. How-
ever, there is a convincing cause for this. Lerner repeatedly emphasized functions
of private investments, which were almost equal to venture capital. He delved into
the details on what eect the private investments had and found that the success of
awardees was dependent on their ability to attract venture capital [5].
Venture capital under management in the U.S. was worth 267 billion dollars in
2012 [10]. However, that in Japan was worth 1 billion dollars in 2012 [11] 1. The
relative size of Japanese venture capital is 0.003. As we mentioned earlier, the SBIR
program in Japan is one hundredth of that in the U.S. This means that the relative
size of venture capital in Japan is a thirtieth of that in the U.S. In this situation,
1We assume 1 U.S. dollar= 100 Japanese yen.
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small rms can only acquire loan from banks or public agencies. This situation is
far from the goal of SBIR and can be likened to a rocket without a fuel tank.
As we saw in panel C of Table 3, the awards certainly assisted R&D. Combined
with the other results, commercialization assistance, which is the most important
part of the program, seemed to have a problem. The SBIR program in the U.S.
methodically supports the commercialization of seeds grown by the program [7].
The support includes a committee made up of researchers at universities, national
institutes, or those who were nance professionals. In comparison, we could not
nd any similar support available in Japan as is the case in the U.S. Although it is
reasonable to assume that commercialization is the most dicult part of R&D, it
seems that Japan has not properly budgeted for commercialization.
As we mentioned in Section 1, Eshima carried out the same overall analyses
in Japan [6] and said that SBIR awardees yielded positive results. His work is
important as the rst attempt toward SBIR analyses in Japan but the analyses
seem to have the three problems. First, he made matching sets in a dierent way
from that by Lerner, nevertheless he could. Since he started from Lerner's work,
as we did, avoiding comparisons of results without any explanation seems to be
unfair. Second, he mentioned he used phase II awardees' data, the same as Lerner
had done, but until 2007, the SBIR program in Japan did not have a phase system.
Finally, there was no regression analysis that Lerner had done. Regression analysis
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is important to see what eect SBIR has by controlling other variables. Therefore,
our paper can provide fuller and sounder analyses and comparisons.
4.2 Eect of subsidies controlled by rms' attributes
We discussed previously the overall eect of the SBIR program, we will next delve
into more precise analyses by introducing regression analyses. Table 4 lists the vari-
ables used in the regression analyses. Most of them have been used in the previous
analyses. Table 5 is a correlation matrix for independent/control variables. As we
cannot see any strong correlations, we can presumably place them into regression
models.
Table 6 summarizes the growth in sales and employment in the regression mod-
els. All variables are taken from Table 4. Panels A, B, and C correspond to changes
in sales, changes in employment, and the number of patents. Also, these dependent
variables are the same as those in overall analyses listed in Table 3. A core indepen-
dent variable is \Any SBIR award in 2004-2006" and a core control variable is \2006
sales" or \2006 employment." Models with even numbers also have other control
variables of age, location, and industry.
Panels A and B strongly indicate that SBIR awardees could not increase in sales
or employment even after controls by sales, employment, and other control variables
were introduced. This is a backup of the overall analyses. The results in Panel
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C also support the overall analyses. Winning SBIR awards positively aects the
acquisition of registered patents. Even in model (10) which was strongly controlled,
SBIR awards demonstrated signicance.
5 Conclusion
We examined the direct eects of the SBIR program in Japan through rms' at-
tributes. First, we compared changes in sales, employment, and the number of
patents between SBIR awardees and matching rms. The SBIR awardees did not
perform better in sales or employment. Therefore, it seems that the direct eects
of the SBIR program are not positive. However, the awardees performed better in
the number of patents. Second, we examined the overall results by using regression
models. Even with control variables, these results were sustained, which means they
are robust.
In closing, we need to suggest some ideas to improve the program. First, it is
most important to rigorously assess the program. Although most countries have
recognized that small businesses are the key to economic growth, and where Japan
is no exception, its ministries and agencies have not been sincere at all. Even when
budgets are not fully available, it is easy to \set aside" some of the budget to
assess the program. Normally, the work discussed in this paper should be formally
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conducted. Second, appropriate exits for awardees are not clear. We could not nd
whether ministries and agencies had strategies to create new markets after successful
R&D projects were completed by awardees. It could even be said that the program
has just been prolonging the life of small rms. Since we could learn from practices
in the U.S. of assessment and situations where small rms in the U.S. could readily
create seeds of commercialization, the ideas described here can probably be carry
out.
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Table 1: Construction of sample of SBIR awardees and matching rms: Number
of samples we constructed. Basic data on 301 SBIR awardees. For each awardee,
we chose a rm that was industry-matched and closest in sales and a rm that was
location-matched and closest in sales. TDB means Teikoku Data Bank data, which
includes data on Japanese rms. Firms available in analyses means rms with valid
data for regression analyses.
Firms No. of rms
SBIR awardees that received one or more awards
in 1998-2010 (including individuals) 1,640
in 2004-2006 (including individuals) 507
in 2004-2006 having valid data in TDB (rms) 301
Matching rms selected from TDB paired with SBIR awardees
Industry-matched and closest sales 301
Location-matched and closest sales 301
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Table 2: Comparison of SBIR awardees and matching rms: Sample data are com-
pared to check validity of matching rms. Units for sales and capital are in thou-
sands of yen. Matching rms were selected according to 2006 sales, industries, and
locations and seem well controlled.
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
SBIR awardees:
2006 sales 2,446,647 4,510,382 721 31,567,815
2006 employment 82 129.7 2 1,003
2006 capital 198,767 781,359 3,000 96,653,241
2006 age 38.78 25.5 2 134
No. of patents applied for in 2004-2006 4.9 12.8 0 182
No. of patents applied for in records 22.1 58.2 0 678
Matching rms:
2006 sales 2,444,274 4,503,626 900 31,818,825
2006 employment 1,155 26,533.6 1 650,000
2006 capital 147,300 880,616 2,500 18,078,848
2006 age 41.48 24.5 2 134
No. of patents applied for in 2004-2006 1.1 6.2 0 85
No. of patents applied for in records 7.2 42.0 0 690
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Table 3: Growth of SBIR awardees and matching rms: Changes in sales indicate
no dierences between SBIR awardees and matching rms. Dierences in changes
in employment are signicant with median. Since data do not seem to have a
normal distribution, signicance is more reliable than that with mean. Dierences
in numbers of patents are signicant. Three hundred one observations were made
for SBIR awardees and 602 for matching rms.
SBIR Matching p-value of
awardees rms comparison
A. Change in sales, 2006-2011:
Mean -197,412 -100,976
75th percentile 92,054 62,549
Median -27,770 -29,891
25th percentile -270,350 -253,208
SE 113,783.3 10,9526.8
p-value of t test 0.54
p-value of Mann-Whitney test 0.63
B. Change in employment, 2006-2011:
Mean -2.1 -1,094
75th percentile 9.0 4.0
Median 0 0
25th percentile -4.0 -4.0
SE 2.2 1,090.5
p-value of t test 0.31
p-value of Mann-Whitney test 0.01
C. No. of patents, 2006-2011:
Mean 2.6 0.7
75th percentile 3.0 0
Median 1.0 0
25th percentile 0 0
SE 0.38 0.19
p-value of t test 0.00
p-value of Mann-Whitney test 0.00
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Table 5: Correlation matrix for control and independent variables used in regres-
sions: There are no large correlations between them.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) 2006 sales 1.00 -0.01 0.17 0.22 0.00
(2) 2006 employment 1.00 0.00 0.04 -0.02
(3) Capital 1.00 -0.06 0.03
(4) Age 1.00 -0.05
(5) Any SBIR award in 2004-2006 1.00
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Table 6: Results of regression analyses: Dependent variables are changes in sales
and employment between 2006 and 2011 and the number of patents from 2006
to 2011. Models (2), (4), (6), (8), and (10) include locations and industries as
control variables. Since they are categorical data, they are not listed in the tables.
Signicance signs are *** for p<0.001, ** for p<0.01, * for p<0.05, and . for p<0.1
A. OLS regressions with change and percentage change in sales as dependent variables
Dependent Change % Change
variables in sales in sales
Model number (1) (2) (3) (4)
Any SBIR award in 2004-2006 -9.5e+04 -2.2e-02 -4.4e-08 2.0e-08
2006 sales -8.4e-02 *** -1.6e+05 7.1e-01 4.4e-01
Age 1.7e+02 -1.9e-02
B. OLS regressions with change and percentage change in employment as dependent variables
Dependent Change % Change
variables in employment in employment
Model number (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any SBIR award in 2004-2006 1.1e+01 1.1e+01 1.1e-02 -6.9e-04
2006 employment -1.0e-00 *** -1.0e-00 *** -1.7e-06 -1.3e-06
Age 1.2e+00 *** -1.4e-03
C. OLS regressions with number of patents as dependent variables
Dependent Number of
variables patents
Model number (9) (10)
Any SBIR award in 2004-2006 1.9e+00 *** 1.4e+00 ***
2006 sales 3.0e-07 *** 3.4e-07 ***
Age -1.5e-02 .
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